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Evolution and Epilepsy in Bleak House 
ANNA NEILL 
 
At the end of How the Mind Works, Stephen Pinker talks about the arts as a non 
adaptive by-product of human evolution. To an evolutionary psychologist, he observes,  
art, like cheesecake or pornography, is best understood as a technology for stimulating 
sensual enjoyment. The gratification we experience in art is the effect of having our 
“pleasure buttons”1 pressed, and the “highfalutin” literary-critics who endeavor to extract 
serious meaning from, especially, popular culture fail to grasp the psychology that drives 
the consumption of art, not to mention the utterly peripheral nature of their own 
intellectual enterprise from the point of view of species survival.2 Later in the chapter, he 
moves to a discussion of the riddles of the mind that remain unsolved by modern 
neuroscience: consciousness in the sense, not only of coherent subjective awareness and 
the unified center of experience known as the “self,” but also the puzzle of free will in an 
apparently deterministic universe.1 Like enjoying a good novel, the contemplation of 
such questions is “biologically frivolous.”3
In an analysis intended to highlight Pinker’s simplification of the role of art in 
human experience, Joseph Carroll has shown how Bleak House emphasizes the adaptive 
advantage that literary culture confers on those who have access to it. The petty-
 They cannot be adequately addressed by 
human intelligence, for natural selection simply has not equipped us with the means to 
solve them. After all, the mind need only support our survival in roughly the same way as 
it did for our remote ancestors.  
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mindedness and spitefulness of the Smallweeds, he points out, is directly linked to the 
family’s disapproval of story books and fables, whereas Esther’s survival and self-
determination confirm her capacity to create an imaginative world through which she can 
“fashion an environment that is adequate to [her] needs of self-development.4
The adaptive talent described by Carroll, which enables characters in the novel to 
thrive socially and emotionally through habits of mental discipline, is not really delivered 
by the chance advantage that Darwin was later to identify as the key mechanism of 
evolutionary change. Instead, Bleak House reflects aspects of an ameliorative 
evolutionism that sees positive species change as the product of individual effort. The 
principle that organisms strive towards ever greater complexity was established at the 
turn of the century with Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s theory of heritable acquired 
characteristics, and popularized in Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History of 
Creation (1844), which argued for the innate progressive tendency of all phenomena. In 
the 1850s and 1860s, Herbert Spencer formulated the theory of development as a 
synthetic principle of scientific knowledge, arguing that all nature intrinsically moves 
upward into increasing levels of complexity. Concomitantly, he interpreted non-
progressive change as the return to a more primordial state of being, and balanced his 
  In what 
follows, I will suggest that the novel offers another kind of response to Pinker’s 
assertions, one that highlights, not the activity of the self-determining will, but rather the 
mental events that escape its disciplining influence. In its depiction of strange alterations 
of consciousness and the spectral forms they sometimes generate, I propose, Bleak 
House, previews a later-century, physiologically-based investigation of some of the 
phenomena that point to Pinker’s unsolvable mysteries of the mind. 
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account of evolution as the tendency to increasing heterogeneity with a principle of 
“dissolution,” or a propensity to drift back to more primitive, homogenous states. Even as 
it brings very non-Darwinian principles of self-improvement and development to fictional 
life, I will argue, Dickens’s novel also invokes the figure of dissolution, which permeates 
the narrative voices in Bleak House.   
These voices are sensitive, not only, as Carroll argues, to the self-improving 
potential of the mind, but also to its opposing tendencies. Such tendencies take the form, 
not of small-mindedness or moral weakness, but rather of voluminous mental states in 
which clairvoyant glimpses into the story that will follow or ghostly visitations penetrate 
and disarrange the otherwise ordering activities of consciousness as it seeks to make 
sensory and cognitive sense of the world it encounters. These states infect Esther’s story 
in particular (although, as we shall see, they do also affect the omniscient narrator), 
suspending both her coherent sense of self, situated in a particular place and a particular 
time, and her self-determining will. At such moments, her mind, flooded by subjective 
awareness, becomes attuned to a range of possible identities or phantom selves, past, 
present and future. This state represents the inverse of adaptive success: As Esther’s 
objective consciousness recedes, her will falters, and she is temporarily unable to look at 
herself sternly as an objective observer, or to fashion her social position as the “useful, 
amiable [and] serviceable,” “little woman” of obscure origins to whom friends turn for 
comfort and advice.5
Despite the range of nervous disorders that Esther’s dreamy episodes might point 
to, there are several reasons why I will read them here as symptoms of epilepsy. The first 
and probably least compelling of these is biographical: Dickens himself suffered what 
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may have been epileptic seizures as a child.6  He also witnessed the phrenologist John 
Elliotson’s magnetic treatment of the epileptic Elizabeth O’key in 1838.7 The second 
reason is that, while the only true epileptic character in Bleak House, Mrs. Snagsby’s 
servant Guster, is very minor, the much more prominent Bradley Headstone of Our 
Mutual Friend and Monks of Oliver Twist also suffer from grand-mal seizures, which 
seem to function metaphorically as symptoms of their villainy and mental anguish. Thus, 
while more critical attention has been paid to the figures of monomania and hysteria than 
to epilepsy in Dickens’s work, “fits” brought on by an obsessive preoccupation with 
something or somebody, or by a horrified discovery of the subject’s implication in a 
network of events or characters, or by response to a psychic trigger (like Monks’s 
loathing reaction to the sound of thunder), suggest that fanaticism and fixation, along 
with falling and writhing, may be interpreted as symptoms of epilepsy.8  Through his 
contact with asylum physicians,9 Dickens was aware of studies of mental illness that 
identified overlap and potential diagnostic confusions among epilepsy, hysteria and 
monomania.10
The third reason is that nineteenth-century neurologists became increasingly 
interested in the dreamy states of mind precursory to or even constitutive of an epileptic 
seizure (the latter being what we now recognize as “complex partial epilepsy”). The 
altered perceptions, ghostly visions, and prescient awareness that can attend the 
heightened subjectivity characteristic of the dreamy state seem especially intriguing in 
Bleak House, where the division of narrative labor between third- and first-person voices 
alerts us to how the subjective mind negotiates the objective world, and where the 
connections between the many improbably related characters and their stories unfold 
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through hazy presentiments as much as they do through the accidents and coincidences of 
the plot: dreamy minds make connections across time and space, linking the poorest of 
London’s poor with a great country family, orphaned nobodies with titled somebodies, 
and the multi-generational suit in Chancery with the ancient line of the Dedlocks. The 
minor, usually comically rendered scenes of Guster’s seizures invite us to read epilepsy 
into the dreaminess of narrative voice where consciousness seems often to hover at a 
great distance from the objective events it means to depict. A dreamy voice which 
represents the mind under the pressure of dreadful self-recognition threatens the very 
order and revitalizing potential of narrative meaning. Like the abyss of Chancery, this 
voice plots uncertain and hazy possibilities and connections more than it does outcomes 
and advantages. 
 
Evolution and Dissolution: Herbert Spencer and John Hughlings Jackson 
 
Dickens’s interest in the treatment of mental illness in the 1850s is documented in 
Household Words, which published numerous articles on asylum reform, including two 
co-written by Dickens himself.11 His knowledge of John Elliotson’s phrenology-based 
mesmerism and his friendship with the asylum physician and reformer, John Conolly, tie 
him to mid-century debate about mental science and medical practice.12At the same time, 
the detail in which he describes nervous symptoms in his fictional and non-fictional 
characters have given him the reputation of a “street psychologist” who practiced “neuro-
psychiatry” on his characters ahead of his own medical time.13 My focus here is on how 
his depictions of disorganized consciousness anticipate the studies of epileptic dreamy 
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phenomena made by the neurologist John Hughlings Jackson after 1876. Indeed, in his 
descriptions of “dreamy states” (coined to describe nervous discharges that are symptoms 
of epilepsy proper, rather than simply warnings), Jackson quoted from David 
Copperfield,14 as did his associate and follower James Crichton-Browne in an 1895 
lecture on “Dreamy Mental States.”15
Spencer himself first used the term “dissolution” in Social Statics (1850), but only 
formulated it as a general principle of evolution in “Progress, its Law and Cause,” 
published in the Westminster Review of April 1857. In First Principles (1862), he argues 
more fully that evolution requires the transformation, by means of adaptive responses to 
the environment, from “an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent 
heterogeneity.”
 While Dickens’s admiration for the asylum 
reformers’ moral treatment of madness suggests a source for the powerful figure of self-
discipline in the novel, the attention he gives to the complex relations between inner 
psychic movements and nervous organization reflects a more neurologically evolutionist 
perspective, replacing the fixed, innate faculties of phrenology with a more dynamic 
understanding of mental physiology and experience. In this respect he looks ahead to 
Spencer’s concept of dissolution, fully formulated in the 1860s, as an inevitable counter-
movement to evolution, and farther to Jackson, who explored how dreamy symptoms of 
seizure expressed dissolution in the highest centers of the nervous system.   
16 As they evolve, he demonstrates, chemical compounds, organisms, 
social institutions, and political structures and economies all become increasingly 
differentiated, specialized and heterogeneous. In The Principles of Psychology (1855), he 
argues specifically that the evolving nervous system can be described as a “progress from 
co-ordinations that are small and simple to those that are larger and compound and to 
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those that are still larger and doubly compound.”17  In his later account of the process of 
dissolution, however, a reverse movement towards indefinite, incoherent homogeneity 
occurs: complex molecules break up and their constituents take on looser structures; 
solids assume liquid and then gaseous forms; organisms decay and die; states dissolve 
through social unrest; commercial societies resume a crude division of labor.18 
Complicating his own usual assumption that all nature strives towards perfectibility, 
Spencer proposes that understanding the present state of any phenomenon demands 
knowledge of both its former, primitive and of its future, decayed forms. “Intellectual 
progress consists largely, if not mainly, of widening our acquaintance with this past and 
this future.”19
In his studies of the pathophysiology of epilepsy, Jackson used Spencer’s models 
of evolution and dissolution to describe changes in nervous organization. Jackson is best 
known for his work on cerebral localization, replacing the static model of the brain 
offered by phrenologists with a dynamic, evolutionist account of the physical laws of 
mind. Along with David Ferrier, he mapped the sensory-motor functions of the cerebrum 
and explored how these effected changes in the brain and hence in mental organization. 
He is also known as the co-founder and editor of the journal Brain, and as the discoverer 
of what is now called “Jacksonian epilepsy,” whose convulsions he traced to lesions in 
the motor regions of the brain. Jackson’s discoveries of the origin of various forms of 
epilepsy in discharging lesions in particular parts of the cortex, enormously advanced 
medical knowledge of the illness. His studies of the “dreamy state,” for which he 
assembled a large number of clinical examples, eventually led to its cerebral localization 
in the medial temporal region.
 
20 
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Like Spencer, Jackson saw the brain evolving through the recombination of 
nervous arrangements  to create permanent and more complex nervous arrangements—a 
movement from the automatic to the increasingly voluntary--as well as through 
permanent changes caused by interaction between these highest centers and the external 
environment. Hence the highest nervous functions (represented in conscious awareness) 
are determined by the most complex nervous arrangements. Dissolution, on the other 
hand, is a “ ‘taking to pieces’ in order from the least organized, most complex and most 
voluntary, towards the most organized, the most simple and most automatic.”21 The 
highest centers of the nervous system, (which Jackson located in the frontal, pre-frontal, 
and occipital lobes) normally exercise inhibitory control over the lower centers.22
In Jackson’s account, all parts of the body are represented, re-represented, and 
then re-re-re-represented at each level of the nervous centers: lower, middle and higher. 
Each level is increasingly complex in its representations of different regions of the body, 
and increasingly distant from the part to which it corresponds. In a healthy organism, 
there is a highly complex cooperation between the movements of different regions: one 
center does not represent one organ, but a whole muscular region and the interaction of 
muscles within that region. Higher, or co-coordinating centers represent “in more 
complex…combinations the part of the body which those lower represent directly in 
 
Because they are the highest and most complex, these are the centers that manifest 
nervous dissolution first, thus bringing about a reduction to a more automatic condition of 
the organism. Hence the excessive discharge of nervous energy that causes a seizure 
provokes a loss of voluntary movement and an increase in involuntary or automatic 
activity.  
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simpler […] combinations.”23 Ultimately, this means that, in these highest centers, each 
unit represents all parts of the body at the same time that it represents one specially.24
Jackson speculates that, if the whole body is represented in the units making up 
the division of the highest centers, with each part of the organ containing nervous 
arrangements for movements of the whole body, then it can be said that each unit is “the 
whole division in miniature” but “each of it is the whole of it in different miniature.”
 
When, for example, a man is pricked on the back, he experiences both the nervous 
stimulation in the region affected, and the stimulation as a state of consciousness: the 
prick is to his back. Object consciousness and subject consciousness are intertwined, 
creating simultaneously a universal and a local awareness. Hence, when organic disease 
causes dissolution in the hierarchy of nervous arrangements, it disturbs this relationship 
between objective and subjective mind.   
25 
Thus each unifying or synthesizing center is “a series of miniature higher centers, each of 
which is in some degree ‘potentially’ the whole organism…in a different degree and 
order of representation of all parts.”26 These units, essentially the material basis of mind, 
therefore exist as potential, as much as they do actual, triggers of particular nervous and 
mental states. Reduced activity, or dissolution, in these centers is likely to increase 
automatic behavior. Although he does not say so directly (perhaps because, as he 
cautions, his description of the nervous cartography that underlies consciousness is only 
conjectural), this theory of nervous representation suggests an origin for the voluminous 
mental phenomena that he calls “dreamy.” If an arrangement between subjective and 
objective awareness co-coordinated by the center disintegrates, a flooding of the psyche 
with a multitude of subjective states that are normally “stored” as potential states in the 
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units that make up the center is likely to occur.  Dreamy states, his case studies show, are 
nearly always experienced as a kind of expanded consciousness, or “a diminished object 
consciousness with increased subject consciousness.”27
In his lectures on the dreamy state as a variety of epilepsy, Jackson records 
experiences from clinical cases.  These include “a feeling of being somewhere else” or 
“in a strange country,”
 
28 and “a blending of past ideas with present” “as if reminiscent of 
a former life.”29 One patient talks about experiencing “curious sensations…a sort of 
transportation to another world, lasting a second or so.”30 Another says “it is not of 
anything that has happened in real life, but is like what has happened.”31 Having argued 
that loss of consciousness is not necessary for a diagnosis of epilepsy, Jackson proposes 
that the disease may manifest as a defective consciousness of present surroundings co-
existing with an “overconsciousness” or dreamy recognition of “some other and quasi-
former surroundings.”32
In large part the dreamy state has been ignored, he suggests, because in itself it 
only represents “slightly raised activities (slightly increased discharges) of healthy 
nervous arrangements.”
 
33
 
 This almost-commonplace character of the state is alluded to, 
Jackson remarks, in the reports of a medical man who himself suffered from brief 
episodes of altered consciousness. Jackson quotes the passage from David Copperfield 
that this physician refers to:  
We all have some experience of a feeling which come over us 
occasionally of what we are saying and doing having been said or done 
before, in a remote time—of our having been surrounded, dim ages ago, 
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by the same faces, objects, and circumstances—of our knowing perfectly 
what will be said next, as if we suddenly remembered it.34
 
 
Not only are such attacks are so slight as to barely disrupt the continuum of normal 
mental experience but, as Dickens emphasizes here, they are almost universally 
experienced. What Jackson refers to as “reminiscence” is an everyday manifestation of 
the dreamy state, a fragment of what is in more extreme cases is experienced as fantastic 
“recollection,” and a strange mingling of apparent memory and clairvoyant anticipation.35
 
 
Here, though a “healthy” mind may barely pause to notice it, surrounding objects and 
people assume a heightened significance, manifesting as figures and events from a past so 
remote that it could not possibly belong to an individual memory. Objects in the external 
environment appear simultaneously to belong in that dim past and to stimulate 
predictions of the immediate future, like forewarning ghosts. These phantoms of subject 
consciousness are everywhere in Dickens, often anticipating revelations that the plot will 
later bring to light. Bleak House, I suggest, foregrounds these everyday episodes of 
dreaminess and, in so doing, explores the origin of clairvoyant and apparitional visions in 
the neuropathology of epilepsy. 
Bleak House 
 
Dickens shared the optimism of many of his scientific contemporaries that 
physical causes would eventually be found to explain the strangest most seemingly non-
material effects. “Wonders will never cease,” an article from the September 1859 issue of 
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All The Year Round, cautions its readers, but perhaps eventually they will belong to the 
“manuals of science” rather than the “curiosities of superstition.” 36 A natural-lawful 
explanation for the appearance of ghosts, he proposed, could be found in further 
investigation of nervous and brain physiology. Specters are the forms generated in mental 
states where present and remembered experiences are allowed to mingle.37 Dickens’s 
own connections experiments with mesmerism were not investigations into the occult but 
studies of the magnetic influences at work in the strange sympathy between minds and 
across physical barriers.38  Louise Henson has described how Dickens’s ghost stories 
were frequently misread as evidence of spiritualism. This interpretation, she points out, 
ignored how the stories, like so many of the articles he published, are far less interested in 
the possibility of the existence of a spirit world than in the place that apparitions occupy 
in the mysteries of the physical universe. Hence he insists on segregating the 
“preposterous state of mind” from the “medical, legal, or other watchful experience.”39
Although Esther demonstrates the “self-determining power” that William 
Benjamin Carpenter argues preserves the agency of the will over the automatic activity of 
the mind,
  
In what remains, I will argue that this segregation is not, in fact, fully enforced in Bleak 
House. In fact, the narrators who perform the role of watchful observers are vulnerable to 
the spectral visions that disturb the order of the objective world. Objective knowledge 
seems to dissolve into apparitional landscapes as often as spirits are disciplined to obey 
the laws of physical nature. 
40 there are many moments in her story when she is not able to control this 
mental activity. The most obvious instance is during her illness when divisions of time 
between childhood, adolescence and youth “became confused with one another” (p. 513) 
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and when her sense of independent self dissolves into an image of the terrifying 
connectedness of everything: “a great flaming necklace” that is “strung together 
somewhere in great black space” (p. 514).Yet these experiences of unreality and the 
altered sense of self that signals the onset of the illness are not entirely new for Esther. 
When she and Charley first leave to visit Jenny’s cottage and help the orphan Jo, they 
pause at the gate leaving Bleak House, where Esther observes a strange light in the sky 
overhanging the darkened skyline of London. The spectacle is both “beautiful and 
awful,” “immovable and heaving,” revealing the terrible worldliness of London’s “waste” 
with the light of a seemingly divine fire (p. 450).  Struck by this strange conflation of 
opposites, Esther experiences a doubleness in her own psyche as she has “for a moment 
an undefinable impression of myself as being something different from what I then was,” 
even though she is quite sure that she had no thought of “what was soon to happen”—
referring perhaps to the symptoms of the illness but more probably to the discovery of her 
parents’ identities (p. 450). Here, in a subjective response to an atmospheric effect (as 
Monks responds to thunder in Oliver Twist), Esther’s objective consciousness is flooded 
by that subjective awareness. She then undergoes one of those not-quite-describable 
moments of detachment from identity that Jackson records, in this case linked to form of 
a peculiar clairvoyance, in which she experiences viscerally the effects of the knowledge 
of her parentage that is yet to come.   
Her dreamy states and the revelations they entail, are always characterized by a 
feeling of indistinctness, whether something undefinable as it is at the garden gate, or the 
haziness of the light under the atmospheric conditions of dawn, twilight, fog, or shadow, 
or by a dreamlike or confused state of mind. The first time she meets Lady Dedlock, her 
 14 
face is “in a confused way, like a broken glass to me, in which I saw scraps of old 
remembrances” (p. 268); the second time, just before mother reveals herself to daughter, 
Esther “cannot say what was in my whirling thoughts” as she is struck by “something in 
her face I had pined for and dreamed of as a little child” p. (532). While she and Inspector 
Bucket are searching for Lady Dedlock at the end of the novel, premonitions of her death 
take on physical symptoms as “thoughts [that] shudder through me” (p. 804), but they 
also have an unreality to them as “I was far from sure that I was not in a dream” (p. 803).  
Recalling the walk to the burial ground where they will find the body, Esther admits to 
“confused impressions”; “it was neither night nor day” (p. 844). Almost-everyday 
fluctuations of consciousness, as Jackson would emphasize, Esther’s memories of events 
are here like her memories of childhood--vague and fragmentary yet overflowing with 
premonition. Or they are like her still more ordinary state of sleep in which objects 
become “indistinct and mingled” (p. 57), and the separate identities of others as well of 
herself dissolves. 
In all of these moments, her awareness of the external world is overwhelmed as 
her subject consciousness is intensified, while her strange sense of not-self, or of a 
ghostly self, is sometimes prelude to a strong premonition. Even when she has not the 
faintest idea of her connection to Lady Dedlock, she feels that “I-I, little Esther 
Summerson, the child who lived a life apart, and on whose birthday there was no 
rejoicing—seemed to arise before my own eyes, evoked out of the past by some power in 
this fashionable lady” (p. 268). Earlier, the first morning she wakes up in Bleak House, 
she watches objects within and outside her room emerge “from the indistinctness of last 
night,” “disclos[ing] the scene over which the wind had wandered in the dark, like my 
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memory over my life” (p. 105). She is referring to a moment the previous night, when she 
had allowed her mind to wander back over her childhood and then “raise[...] up shadowy 
speculations” (p. 95) about her parentage. The simile draws the dim forms of the external 
world—the objects in the dawn light--into the territory of her wandering mind where 
thoughts of the past summon up the ghostly figures of her parents. 
Such apparitional moments, or simply the confusion and indistinctness that often 
accompanies them, are often defeated by Esther’s will. She evades the disarming 
“shadowy speculations” about her parentage by recalling “Esther, Esther! Duty, my 
dear!” (p. 95). She avoids the “fitful, dazzling”(p. 244)  habits of mind that destroy her 
cousin Richard, by exercising the “application and concentration” that he lacks, and she 
recovers from the aura-like “dread and faintness” (p. 532) that precedes her mother’s 
revelation by reflecting upon her “sacred obligation” (p. 538) not to alert others to her 
discovery. Perhaps most powerfully, when she first looks at herself in the mirror after the 
illness has altered her features, she overcomes the estrangement from her own image by 
reminding herself firmly that she must begin life afresh as something other than a beauty. 
At such moments her story celebrates the victory of will over mental confusion and self-
loss. 
There is, however, a character that experiences a far more extreme loss of volition 
than Esther, experiencing not a dreamy state, but rather grand-mal epileptic attacks.  
Guster has “fits”, attributable, the narrator suggests, “to a tender heart, and a susceptible 
something that might have been imagination” (p. 164) if it had not been for her stifling 
upbringing at the hands of the parish. In accordance with Jackson’s cartography of 
nervous disorder, such emotional and intellectual undernourishment results in less 
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activity in the higher nervous structure, suggesting that Guster might more susceptible to 
a disorder in the lower and more automatic centers. Like Esther, and like Jo, whose 
unhappy plight “sends her into a fit of unusual duration” (p. 164), Guster is an orphan.  
Unlike Esther, however, she only communicates the distressed state of her nerves and 
mind through her convulsions, and her ghostliness is that of the improbable séance 
specter so derided by Dickens:  when she announces the visit of the Chadbands, she 
“comes rustling and scratching down the little staircase like a popular ghost.”(p. 281).  
In The Commercial Traveller, Dickens seems to speculate about the interiority of 
the female epileptic that he denies Guster in Bleak House.  Here, the narrator visits a 
ward for the “idiotic and imbecile” in the Wapping workhouse full of women who 
“drop,” “roll,” and “tear.”41
 
  Among these, the one who reputedly has the worst attacks of 
them all, is a young woman who sits “with her face turned up, pondering.”  The traveller 
wonders 
Whether this young woman, brooding like this in the summer season, ever 
thinks that somewhere there are trees and flowers, even mountains and the 
great sea?  Whether, not to go so far, this young woman ever has any dim 
revelation of that young woman who is not here and will never come here, 
who is courted and caressed, and loved, and has a husband, and bears 
children, and lives in a home, and who never knows what it is to have this 
lashing and tearing come upon her?  And whether this young woman, God 
help her, gives herself up then, and drops like a coach-horse from the 
moon?42 
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The traveller’s compassion for the girl, his dismay at the bleakness of her life, is 
expressed here, not in the form of a satire on the poverty of institutional care, but rather 
as an imaginative description of an alternative life of domestically contentment that she 
will probably never live.  As the creation of the sick woman’s mind, this other self arises 
as a “dim revelation.” This spectral self then in turn signals the onset of a grand mal 
seizure. The odd thing is that it is the narrator himself who earlier claimed to have 
encountered the ghost of a drowned man on the swing bridge over the locks near the 
workhouse. Although he describes this “apparition” with not a little irony—it too appears 
like a séance grotesque with “a ghastly grin and a sound like gurgling water in its 
throat”—the ghost functions as a premonition, warning him about the desperate condition 
of the female residents of the workhouse.43
Just as manifestations of the dreamy state become the property of, not only 
cerebral disease, but the ordinary observing mind in this scene, in Bleak House epilepsy 
not only inflicts Guster’s and Esther’s stories, but also the quality of large portions of the 
anonymous narrator’s tale. The fog that covers all of London in the opening paragraphs 
of the novel famously provides a metaphor for the murky conduct of Chancery. This fog 
makes forms indistinct and undistinguishable. It is the first of many of the narrator’s 
descriptions of  atmospheric effects that estrange the observer from a familiar 
environment, like the “dilating” (p. 654) effect of dusk over Tom-all-Alone’s, or the 
 To read this encounter as a clairvoyant 
episode is also to recognize the narrator’s own implication in the scene with the epileptic 
girl: the speculations about what might have been come from him, and the “other young 
woman” is the apparitional creature of his mind as much as it is of the girl’s. 
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twilight over Chesney Wold that changes known forms into “distant phantom[s]” (p. 
593). In this last description, the evening landscape is in sympathy with the ghostly 
presence haunting the house and its contents, in particular casting a menacing shadow 
over the portrait of Lady Dedlock. Uncannily, in describing the way that Chesney Wold 
is still inhabited, in portrait form, by the generations of Dedlocks who have lived there, 
the narrator’s omniscience expands speculatively from the present, visible world into the 
worlds of the lived past, the future, and the dead: 
 
The present summer evening, as the sun goes down, the preparations are 
complete.  Dreary and solemn the old house looks, with so many 
appliances of habitation, and with no inhabitants except the pictured forms 
upon the walls.  So did these come and go, a Dedlock in possession might 
have ruminated passing along; so did they see this gallery hushed and 
quiet, as I see it now; so think, as I think, of the gap that they would make 
in this domain when they were gone; so find it, as I find it, difficult to 
believe that it could be, without them; so pass from my world, as I pass 
from theirs, now closing the reverberating door; so leave no blank to miss 
them, and so die. (pp. 592-3) 
 
Here the narrator breaks the rules of third-person anonymity, projecting his voice into the 
body of a Dedlock and there inhabiting a subjective, first-person ‘I’ whom we have not 
encountered before. This spectral intrusion into the objective world then itself becomes 
the occasion for an imaginative, if not clairvoyant, representation of the dead ancestors 
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that moves simultaneously into the past and into the future. It is the moment in this 
narrator’s tale that parallels Esther’s vertiginous reflection following her illness that “I 
felt for myself as the dead may feel if they ever revisit these scenes” (p. 653). The 
narrator’s Dedlock imagines himself as a dead ancestor who in turn tries to imagine a 
future in which he is no longer the living master of the house. This layering of spectral 
voices and the collapse of linear time it temporarily effects is dizzying. Reader and 
narrator recover their balance only when the living and the dead are separated again by 
the closing of the “the reverberating door” (p. 593). Then the portraits assume a 
comfortably caricature-like quality as they come to satirical life in the light of the sunset: 
a Justice winks; and an ancestress in high-heels assumes a halo.  
The narrator’s prescience is sometimes manifest in the subjunctive mood of the 
voice that asks, as it does in the passage above, about what a character, real or imagined, 
“might have” thought or whether, for instance, Tulkinghorn would see a woman pass if 
he looked out the window at a certain moment.  It is the voice that suggests “it may be the 
gathering gloom of the evening or it may be the darker gloom within herself” that casts a 
shadow on Lady Dedlock’s face “as if” she wished for Tulkinghorn’s death (p. 598, my 
emphasis), and it is the voice that examines the scene of Tulkinghorn’s murder with 
cinematic precision while imagining the ghost stories that the details it notes will spawn.  
This voice sacrifices both omniscient knowledge of the minds of characters (the 
knowledge that Tulkinghorn himself, “always at hand, haunting every place” [p. 681], 
possesses and uses to his own dark ends), as well as knowledge about the visible world 
based on “forensic” evidence of the kind Guppy assembles, for intuitive anticipation of 
possible revelations or events to come. Hence, even as the narrator describes how Bucket 
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“mounts a high tower in his mind” (p. 798) to deduce the whereabouts of Lady Dedlock 
in the dramatic closing scenes of the novel, that narrative voice almost imperceptibly 
slips away from the detective’s rational, speculating mind to uncover the mystery for the 
reader well  in advance of Bucket and Esther’s too-late discovery. At this moment, 
Bucket’s reasoned deduction surrenders to a subjunctive mood that carries the reader 
beyond ordinary perception and discovery, not by penetrating the objective and 
subjective worlds of all places and all characters, but by inhabiting a field of the possible: 
 
Where is she? Living or dead, where is she? If, as he folds the 
handkerchief and carefully puts it up, it were able, with an enchanted 
power, to bring before him the place where she found it… would he 
descry her there? On the waste, where the brick-kilns are burning with a 
pale blue flare; where the straw-roofs of the wretched huts in which the 
bricks are made, are being scattered by the wind…there is a lonely figure 
with the sad world to itself. It is the figure of a woman too, but it is 
miserably dressed, and no such clothes ever came through the hall, and out 
at the great door, of the Dedlock mansion. (p. 798) 
   
Such dissolution, manifest in the drifting away from definite forms and signs, 
offsets what elsewhere seems like the narrator’s evolutionist perspicacity. The narrator 
opens his first chapter with the twin images of a megalosaurus wandering up Holborn 
Hill and of “new deposits to the crust upon crust of mud” (p. 11) created by London’s 
foot walkers, collapsing the comings and goings of the present into the vastness of 
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geological time and intimating the interconnectedness of events as they are shaped by 
inevitable and unchanging natural forces. “What  connexion,” he asks, “can there have 
been between many people in the innumerable histories of this world, who, from opposite 
sides of great gulfs have, nevertheless, very curiously been brought together!” (p. 235). 
Given the mid-century popularity of Robert Chambers’s Vestiges and the fact that 
Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology had gone through seven editions by 1851, it is hard 
not to interpret the “gulfs” he invokes here as those among natural forms and species as 
well as among social classes. Yet he has little faith in evolutionary progress.  Although he 
stresses that moral and intellectual strength are realized in the interaction between a 
human being and its environment, these are not acquired characteristics that will be 
passed down to future generations what amounts to a progressive improvement of the 
species, for neglect and indifference will always return a creature to its most primitive 
form. Hence even the “lower animals” at Chesney Wold, he speculates, might have more 
“motions of fancy” (95) than the stunted imaginations of the servants and stable hands 
that take care of them, and an “educated, improved, developed dog, who has been taught 
his duties and knows how to discharge them” (p. 238) can, unlike the poor, uneducated 
orphan Jo, respond to his environment with more than brute sense. Hence too the dog, we 
are reminded, if turned wild, like Jo, will produce descendents that lack any of these 
domestic talents. Because he is continually being “moved on,” Jo’s mental and physical 
condition ironizes the very idea of evolutionary progress in a city where everything is 
“moving to some purpose”(p. 291).  
This social dissolution, imaged as a descending hierarchy of social beings, 
traverses the episodes and descriptions of mental dissolution. When Guster offers Jo 
 22 
food, asks him whether he has any parents, and lays the “first decent hand” upon him, she 
has to repress “symptoms favorable to the fit” (p. 384). Meanwhile Jo himself is 
rendered, as he so often is, mute and “petrified” (p. 383). Both have suffered, like Esther, 
because they are orphaned, and both are most vulnerable to a psychomotor dysfunction at 
the moment they experience feelings of domestic tenderness, just as just as Esther is, I 
have argued, affected by her own inklings of familial connection. Yet neither, like her, 
has capacity for self-direction that can summon her to duty with a commanding, 
“Esther!” Esther’s superior mind (the result of the education and affection she has 
received as much as of native determination) often enables her to restrain her own minds 
tendency to dissolution which, as we have seen, gives her an expanded awareness of the 
relationships among people and places. Jo is also paired with Esther, however, as a 
character that belongs to the improbable connection between Chesney Wold and Tom-
All-Alone’s. He is “unconscious of the link” and he “sums up his mental condition, when 
asked a question, by replying that he ‘don’t know nothink.” (p. 235). Esther, on the other 
hand, has a “knowledge of details perfectly surprising” (p. 624) and the capacity, 
however dreadful she finds it, to understand her own place in the unfolding mystery. 
Looking back on her illness, Esther reflects that her object in reporting its 
horrifying symptoms is to contribute to medical knowledge: “It may be that if we knew 
more of such strange afflictions, we might be the better able to alleviate their intensity” 
(p. 514).  This reflects her effort to shape her narrative as an expression of duty rather 
than hubris.  But when the activity of her mind escapes the disciplining exercise of her 
will, her story becomes something other than the record of “progress” it claims to be by 
the title of her first chapter. Ostensibly, the ending secures the providential narrative, as 
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the “goodness and tenderness of God” (p. 911) reveals itself in the blessing and restoring 
of good characters who have suffered: Ada, Charley, and  Caddy. This blessing is 
expanded in the formation of something like Rousseau’s petite société around the 
marriage of Esther and Woodcourt, whose goodness ensures the happiness of all those 
whom they touch: patients, friends, and children alike. Chesney Wold is left to “darkness 
and vacancy” (p. 910), while Bleak House becomes the scene of new life and a 
generation liberated from the moral quicksand of Jarndyce and Jarndyce. Yet Esther’s 
closing reflection seems to shift the narrative emphasis on moral restraint and its 
domestic and social rewards back to the more peculiar activity of her mind. In response to 
her husband’s suggestion that the mirror should show her that, despite the scars of her 
illness, she is prettier than ever, she responds privately in the form of an incomplete 
phrase whose mood is subjunctive: “they can very well do without much beauty in me—
even supposing—.” (p. 914). This phrase ends the novel with moral as well as semantic 
uncertainty: what if she were more beautiful than before her illness? The mirror suddenly 
ceases to be an instrument of self-discipline. It is possible to read this closing speculation 
as another moment of dissolution, a form of knowing that is neither that of third-person 
narrative omniscience nor of first-person moral self-fashioning. Instead it represents a 
heightening of subjectivity as awareness of the objective world becomes confused.  
Esther’s closing half-thought invokes the ghostly form that represents the dissolving of a 
conscious moment into a host of potential states. It suggests, that is to say, the dimness 
and unreality that accompany the mind’s release from the certain forms of daylight.  
 
Anna Neill, University of Kansas 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In Dickens’s novels, nervous seizures trigger dreamy, clairvoyant episodes in which 
normally imperceptible connections and relations among events and characters come to 
light. During such episodes, which the neurologist John Hughlings Jackson would 
describe as “voluminous” states of consciousness, the boundaries of the self dissolve, and 
the mind becomes attuned to a range of possible identities or phantom selves.  The 
specters unleashed in this state of nervous “dissolution,” haunt Bleak House even as they 
illuminate relations among members of vastly different social worlds and the great 
institutional forces that finger the most intimate events of the mind. 
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